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Abstract 
 
Short selling reporting obligations are helpful to regulators, particularly in deterring abusive 
behaviour. The EU Short Selling Regulation introduces common reporting requirements, 
however only some of these rules can be welcomed. Such issues become particularly evident 
when considering a recent ESMA report on the EU rules. Turning to the US, it has paid far 
less attention to short sale reporting obligations, however the SEC recently published a report 
analyzing the reporting proposals contained in the Dodd-Frank legislation.  
 
This paper examines the approach taken to short sale reporting in the EU and US and 
discusses the recent reports. It suggests that changes are required in both jurisdictions to 
ensure reporting rules can be helpful rather than a hindrance. 
  
                                                      
* DPhil candidate in Law, University of Oxford (elizabeth.howell@law.ox.ac.uk). This research was 
supported financially by the Carnegie Trust. The author would like to thank Professor Jennifer Payne 
for her very helpful advice. Any errors are the responsibility of the author. For ease of reference a table 
containing some pertinent terms is attached as an appendix to this paper. 
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Short Selling Reporting Rules in the EU and the US: A Greenfield Area 
Elizabeth Howell 
1 Introduction 
 
The European Short Selling Regulation (the ‘Regulation’)
1
 came into force in November 
2012. Of particular relevance to this paper are the Regulation’s reporting requirements 
applicable to shares. It opts for a two-tier approach, with notification to the regulator of 
individual net short positions (‘NSPs’) triggered at a particular threshold, and disclosure to 
the market commencing at a higher threshold. Although the private notification obligations 
can be broadly welcomed, the public disclosure rules raise concerns. Indeed, such issues 
become particularly evident when considering the Regulation’s recent evaluation, conducted 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA Evaluation’).
2
 However, despite 
this, the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) subsequently recommended no changes 
be made to the rules at present.
3
 
 
In contrast the US has paid far less attention to reporting obligations: such provisions 
currently form only a small part of its regulatory framework. Further, those rules in place 
stem from a variety of sources and do not facilitate the efficient investigation of potential 
cases of market abuse by the Securities Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’).  Indeed when 
contrasted with the EU, no current data regularly provides the identities of short sellers to the 
SEC.   
 
However the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (the ‘Dodd-
Frank’ Act) set out new proposals concerning short sale reporting, including a requirement for 
the SEC to conduct two studies in relation to short sale positions and transaction reporting. 
The SEC was required to report its results to Congress by July 2011, however it missed the 
deadline. The report was submitted in June 2014, and concluded that none of the options were 
likely to be cost effective.
4
 The SEC compared the proposals to a baseline of existing 
information plus data that would potentially be available following the creation of a 
comprehensive data repository for all information concerning orders and execution for 
exchange-listed securities and options (the Consolidated Audit Trail (‘CAT’)).
5
  Although this 
is to an extent a sensible conclusion, the CAT is still at an early stage and much will hinge on 
how it ultimately proceeds.   
 
This paper examines the approach taken to short selling transparency obligations in the EU 
and US and discusses the recent ESMA and SEC reports. To an extent it is a somewhat 
technical discussion: although the EU rules are relatively clear, the current US rules are rather 
convoluted and fragmented in nature.  Nonetheless this is an important discussion and the 
paper suggests the US has lessons to learn from the EU, especially in relation to the EU’s 
notification regime of individual short positions. Adopting such a requirement would 
                                                      
1 Council Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps [2012] OJ L86/1 
2 ESMA, ‘Technical Advice on the Evaluation of the Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps’ (June 
2013). 
3 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Evaluation of the Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit 
Default Swaps’ (December 2013) 2-4. 
4 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (5 June 2014). 
5 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (18 July 2012) 1. 
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particularly assist regulators in combating possible cases of market abuse: one of the SEC’s 
particular concerns.
6
  However the EU should also take heed from the US, particularly 
concerning its development of the CAT. One of the biggest concerns in relation to the EU 
reporting obligations is the lack of harmonization of the reporting rules between regulators. 
With this in mind, the introduction of a centralized reporting system would be far more 
keeping with the Regulation’s recitals that state the reporting obligations should be applied in 
a ‘uniform’ manner throughout the Union.
7
 
2 Short Selling Concerns and Regulatory Tools 
 
Three perceived concerns are often raised with respect to short selling: market destabilization, 
settlement risk, and market abuse. There are a number of regulatory tools that can be used 
with respect to these issues, including the imposition of short selling restrictions, adopting 
strict settlement obligations, and stipulating transparency requirements on market 
participants. These tools can be used separately or in some combination with one another. 
 
Due to market destabilization concerns, short selling was the subject of short selling bans 
during the financial crisis. However, despite populist concerns that short selling can 
destabilize markets, short selling improves market efficiency: it contributes to efficient 
pricing, liquidity and leads to a more efficient price discovery process.
8
 Equally, restrictions 
generally make markets less efficient and there is little evidence that short selling constraints 
support prices and prevent price declines.
9
 Further, although ‘naked’ short selling
10
 can 
disrupt the market’s orderly functioning if a seller is unable to deliver the shares to the buyer, 
it is not necessary to restrict short selling to tackle this concern. Imposing strict settlement 
periods with penalties for ‘failures to deliver’ should be sufficient to combat this. 
 
Next, although short selling can be used abusively, it is not abusive per se. Indeed, as most 
jurisdictions have market manipulation regimes in place, such rules should be enforced more 
effectively to prevent any abusive behaviour occurring. Further, although public disclosure 
rules may help detect any abusive activity, such requirements can also deter short sellers from 
trading through the desire to avoid scrutiny, leading to a reduction in liquidity. Equally, other 
unsophisticated traders may follow the short seller’s actions (‘herding behaviour’) reinforcing 
the price tendency and leading to the price spirals regulators are trying to prevent.  
 
In contrast, requiring private notifications of individual NSPs can be helpful in tackling 
abusive behaviour without any of the downsides attached to public disclosure. However, such 
requirements should be limited to situations where, for instance, there is a perceived concern 
as to disorderly markets, or a high risk of market abuse occurring. 
 
 
 
                                                      
6 E.g. SEC, ‘Amendments to Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-61595 (Final Rule)’ (February 26, 2010) 
1-2. 
7 Regulation 236/2012, recital 3. 
8 E.g. Edward M. Miller, ‘Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion’ (1977) 32 J Fin 1151. 
9 E.g. Yang Bai, Eric Chang and Jiang Wang, ‘Asset Prices under Short-Sales Constraints’ (2006) 
Working Paper <http://web.mit.edu/wangj/www/pap/BCW_061112.pdf> accessed 10 December 2012. 
10 I.e. where an investor sells shares without borrowing them in advance or making arrangements to 
ensure they can be borrowed. 
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3 The EU’s Reporting Requirements 
 
3.1 Two-Tier Regime  
 
The Regulation introduces a two-tier private and public reporting regime at initial and 
incremental thresholds triggered by the size of an individual NSP. A person’s NSP is defined 
as the position that remains after deducting any long position a person holds from any short 
position in relation to a company’s issued share capital (‘ISC’).
11
 A short position is defined 
as a short sale
12
 of a share issued by a company, or entry into a transaction which creates or 
relates to a financial instrument other than the company share where the effect or one of the 
effects is to confer a financial advantage on the person entering into the transaction in the 
event of a decrease in the price or value of the share.
13
  The rules therefore encompass direct 
and indirect positions, including those created through the use of derivatives.
14
 
 
Article 5: Private Notification 
 
Article 5 provides that a person who has a NSP in relation to a company’s ISC that has shares 
admitted to trading on a trading venue shall notify the relevant competent authority where the 
position reaches 0.2 per cent of the ISC and each 0.1 per cent increment above that (e.g. at 0.3 
per cent and 0.4 per cent).
15
  A trading venue is defined as a regulated market or multilateral 
trading facility
 16
 and the relevant competent authority is defined as the competent authority of 
the Member State where the share was first admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
trading venue.
17
 
 
Article 6: Public Notification 
 
Article 6 of the Regulation provides that a person who has a NSP shall disclose details of that 
position to the public where the position reaches 0.5 per cent of the ISC and each 0.1 per cent 
increment above that.
18
  
 
Timing  
 
The relevant time for the calculation of a NSP will be at midnight at the end of the trading 
day on which the person holds the relevant position, and the report is required to be made not 
later than at 15.30 on the following trading day.
19
   
                                                      
11 Regulation 236/2012, art 3(4).  
12 Ibid art 2(b) defines a short sale. 
13 Ibid, arts 3(1)(a)-(b). The concept of a long position is also correspondingly wide, see art 3(2). 
14 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of 
Credit Default Swaps with Regard to Definitions, the Calculation of Net Short Positions, Covered 
Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, Notification Thresholds, Liquidity Thresholds for Suspending 
Restrictions, Significant Falls in the Value of Financial Instruments and Adverse Events [2012] OJ 
274/1, Annex I, Part 1 contains a list of financial instruments that constitute indirect long positions and 
can constitute indirect short positions (options, futures etc.).  
15 Regulation 236/2012 arts 5(1)-(2). A notification must also be made if the position falls below the 
relevant threshold. 
16 Ibid art 2(1)(l). 
17 Ibid art 2(1)(j)(v).   
18 Ibid arts 6(1)-(2). Disclosure must also be made if the position falls below the relevant threshold. 
19 Ibid art 9(2).  
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3.1.1 Direct and Indirect Positions 
As observed, to calculate a NSP, a person must net off any long and short positions it holds in 
relation to a company’s ISC. The rules cover direct and indirect short positions, and 
Delegated Regulation 918/2012 provides that the calculation must take into account 
transactions in all financial instruments, whether on or outside a trading venue, that confer a 
financial advantage in the event of a change in price or value of the share.
20
  This means the 
rules also encompass short positions accumulated over-the-counter (‘OTC’) provided that the 
NSP is created with respect to shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in the EU.
21
   
 
Delegated Regulation 918/2012 also provides that holding a share through a long position in a 
basket of shares, and the short sale of a share through the short sale of a basket of shares shall 
also be taken into account to the extent the share is represented in the basket.
22
  Likewise, 
shares held indirectly by way of any index, or exchange-traded fund (‘ETF’)
23
 or similar 
entity are also included, and positions shall be calculated taking into account the weight of 
that share in the basket, index or fund.
24
 
4 Comments  
4.1 Private Notification 
 
Notifying individual NSPs to regulators is valuable: it can provide early warning signs 
concerning the build up of, and who holds, a short position, enabling necessary follow up 
enquiries to then take place.
25
  This can therefore help deter and constrain any particularly 
aggressive short selling that could be perceived to constitute a threat to the orderly 
functioning of markets.
26
 
 
However the Regulation’s notification thresholds will be quickly crossed, especially by funds 
focusing on small market capitalization entities. As a result, there is a risk of overwhelming 
regulators with responses. Further, as the requirements are not restricted to financial sector 
firms, this could result in a lot of ‘white noise’ making it difficult for regulators to draw 
sensible conclusions from the data.
27
  Market participants reiterated this to ESMA: some 
considered the thresholds to be too low,
28
 and some perceived the increments to be too narrow 
and require more reporting than was useful.
29
 
                                                      
20 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, art 10(1)-(3).  
21 Rodolphe Baptiste Elineau, ‘Regulating Short Selling in Europe after the Crisis’ (2012) 8 
International Law & Management Review 61, 72.  Delegated Regulation 918/2012 also sets out the 
method of calculation for a net position, providing that the ‘delta-adjusted’ model be used. For further 
details, see Appendix. 
22 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, arts 5-6.  
23 For ‘ETF’ definition, see Appendix.  
24 Delegated Regulation 918/2012 Annex II, Part 1, art 10(3). See also art 3(3) of the Regulation. 
25 FSA, ‘Short Selling Discussion Paper 09/1’ (2009) 29.  
26 CESR, ‘Report: Model for a Pan-European Short Selling Disclosure Regime’ (March 2010) 5-6. 
Further, the decision to require notification of net rather than gross positions should be welcomed. 
Gross position reporting may not provide such an accurate picture or reflect the true market exposure. 
27 E.g. CFA, CFA Society of the UK: Response to EC Public Consultation on Short Selling (10 July 
2010) 4.  
28 E.g. AIMA, AIMA/MFA Response to the Call for Evidence by ESMA (15 March 2013). 
29 E.g. Eumedion, ESMA Call for Evidence (15 March 2013) 2. 
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Consequently, although these requirements should be broadly welcomed, it would be 
preferable to limit their ambit. For example, the rules could be restricted to situations where 
there was a perceived risk of disorderly markets occurring, such as in relation to leading 
financial sector securities.
30
  Further, the rules could also enable regulators to require 
notifications on a more ‘ad hoc’ basis to investigate cases of suspected market abuse.
31
  This 
would help enhanced the quality of the information being received while also reducing 
investors’ on-going costs.     
 
4.2 Public Disclosure  
 
Turning to the public reporting rules, such disclosures can provide information about the price 
movements short sellers expect and can improve the efficiency of price discovery, if correctly 
interpreted.
32
  However this needs to be carefully balanced against the serious drawbacks that 
may result from such disclosures. 
 
First, as these requirements will identify short sellers, this may significantly reduce the 
overall level of short selling and will lead to lower trading volumes: a reduction in market 
liquidity.
33
  This will stem from the extra costs to short sellers in having to disclose positions 
to the market, and through the cost to them in terms of competitive disadvantage in revealing 
their trading strategies.
34
  Indeed, market participants highlighted to ESMA that there had 
been observed changes to trading behaviour in order to remain under the public threshold.
35
 
Further, public disclosure will also enable other market participants to act unfairly as ‘free 
riders’,
36
 affecting the profits of those who conducted the research. This will reduce the 
incentives to conduct the research and will harm price discovery.
37
  
 
Next, public disclosure by an influential short seller may result in herding behaviour, whereby 
other poorly informed investors seek to profit by ‘jumping on the bandwagon’.
38
  As this 
reinforces the price tendency, this risks exacerbating a downward spiral, exactly the effect the 
                                                      
30 HFSB, Consultation Response to the CESR Proposal for a Pan-European Short Selling Disclosure 
Regime (2009) 4-5. 
31 Ibid 4-5.  
32 Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps 
COM (2010) 482, 29-30. 
33 E.g. Oscar Bernal, Astrid Herinckx and Ariane Szafarz, ‘Which Short-Selling Regulation Is the Least 
Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe’ (2014) 37 International Review of Law and 
Economics 244 looked at fourteen jurisdictions in the EU where short sales took place and daily stock 
information was available between July 2008 - June 2009 and found that disclosure requirements 
reduced trading volumes and raised volatility. 
34 Ibid 246.  
35 ESMA (n 2) 12. 
36 A free rider benefits from a resource without having to pay for the cost of the benefit. 
37 Assosim, European Commission Public Consultation on Short Selling (July 2010) 2. 
38 Oskari Juurikkala, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the EU Short Selling Regulation: A Critical Analysis’ 
(2012) 9 ECFR 307, 318. Indeed, it may mislead the public as it can create the impression that a share 
price is declining when the position is simply a hedge, see Managed Funds Association, Managed 
Funds Association Response to the European Comission's Proposals Relating to Short Selling (July 
2010) 5. 
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rules are seeking to prevent. Alternatively, market participants may suffer from others who 
exploit the information made available to manipulate prices to create a ‘short squeeze’.
39
   
 
Given the benefits short selling brings to markets, these issues should be of particular 
concern: lower trading activity will hamper price adjustments and affect the functioning of 
efficient markets. Indeed, due to the low thresholds and costs associated with public 
disclosure, short sellers may be unwilling to hold disclosable short positions. Instead they 
may seek other mechanisms to achieve their aim: for example they may choose to be less 
active in EU markets and migrate to more liberal markets rather than having their trading 
strategies undermined.
40
  Based on the responses to ESMA, such concerns are not purely 
theoretical: changes observed have included the allocation of capital to markets outside 
Europe.
41
 
 
This outcome, which cannot have been the intention of regulators, will clearly have a 
detrimental effect on EU markets relative to other markets. Thus although the Regulation 
stated that the requirements should address identified risks ‘without unduly detracting from 
the benefits that short selling provides to the quality and efficiency of markets’,
42
 it is evident 
that public disclosure obligations considerably detract from the benefits short selling 
provides. 
 
4.3 De Minimis Threshold? 
 
Turning to the inclusion of direct and indirect positions in the NSP calculation, this helps 
provides regulators with a more comprehensive picture and avoids any easy circumvention of 
the obligations. However, for short positions held indirectly through baskets, indices, or 
ETFs, given that such positions tend to be for hedging purposes rather than to express 
negative sentiment, it would perhaps be sensible to introduce a ‘de minimis’ threshold.
43
  For 
example a position held in a security that represented part of a basket would only be included 
if the security had a minimum weight in the basket (e.g. of 20 per cent or more).
44
  
 
In its Evaluation, ESMA proposed some limited amendments however it was unwilling to 
consider introducing a de minimis regime. This is disappointing: such a system would likely 
produce more meaningful information for regulators, whilst alleviating the burden on market 
participants in terms of calculating such positions.  
 
4.4 Harmonized Implementation?  
 
In practice however, the greatest problem with the EU rules has been the lack of harmonized 
implementation between the regulators.
45
  As each authority has implemented its own 
                                                      
39 For ‘short squeeze’ definition, see Appendix.  
40 Such requirements could also become a de facto restriction on short selling above the public 
disclosure threshold, see AIMA, CESR Consultation Paper on the Proposal for a Pan-European Short 
Selling Disclosure Regime (2009) 10.  
41 AIMA (n 28) 4-5; ESMA (n 2) 12. 
42 Regulation 236/2012, recital 5. 
43 Eumedion (n 29) 3-4. 
44 ESMA, ‘Technical Advice on Possible Delegated Acts Concerning the Regulation on Short Selling 
and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps ((EC) No 236/2012) Final Report ESMA 2012/263’ 
(April 2012) 70. 
45 AIMA (n 28) 1. 
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approach, this has resulted in multiple reporting channels and numerous differences in 
formats and communication methods. For instance the Belgian regulator requires the 
completion of a spreadsheet that includes a unique notification ID and also categorizes 
notifications by type (i.e. new position, updated position etc.).
46
 The French regulator 
provides that an online access account must be created, the method of which varies depending 
on a person’s status (for instance directors of listed companies can create accounts directly 
while persons holding disclosable NSPs must contact an administrator).
47
 The Finnish 
regulator requires that reports must be made via protected email connection, and the British 
regulator provides that different email addresses should be used depending on whether it is a 
private or public report.
48
 
 
The lack of standardization creates significant operational burdens for market participants and 
is also contrary to the intention of achieving harmonized implementation. With this in mind, 
many market participants suggested creating a centralized reporting platform using a 
standardized format. This would be much more efficient and would also improve the quality 
of data being received.
49
 For instance a single EU website could be used for publishing NSP 
disclosures, or ESMA could create a standard reporting form and specify a uniform 
communication method to be used by all national regulators.
50
 
 
Despite such issues, ESMA proposed no changes and appeared strongly swayed by regulators 
who preferred the current arrangements and believed the systems to now be operating 
smoothly.
51
  Such conclusions are again disappointing: the lack of harmonization is the 
antithesis to what the Regulation seeks to achieve. A centralized reporting platform and 
standardized reporting methods would be far more in keeping with its recitals that stated the 
reporting obligations were to be applied in a uniform manner throughout the EU.
52
  
 
4.5 Concluding Comments 
 
In the Commission report that stemmed from ESMA’s Evaluation, it chose not to tackle the 
concerns that have arisen in practice. The Commission stated that there was no need to 
change the methods for calculating NSPs, observed that the current system was ‘functioning 
well’ and stated that a centralized system did not appear to offer substantial benefits.
53
  The 
Commission’s unwillingness to address concerns, or to consider ESMA’s minor amendments 
is unhelpful. Indeed it is hard to agree with the view that the current set-up is functioning 
                                                      
46 Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority, ‘Short Selling’ (2014)  <http://perma.cc/L254-
3H4R> accessed 25 November 2014; AIMA (n 28) 6-7. 
47 Autorité des Marchés Financiers, (2014)  <http://perma.cc/LJ7H-6DZD> accessed 25 November 
2014. 
48 Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘Notification of Short Positions’ (2014)  
<http://perma.cc/NNQ2-5PYJ> accessed 25 November 2014; UK Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Short 
Selling’ (2014)  <http://perma.cc/W3UB-KHMD> accessed 25 November 2014. 
49 Societe Generale, Response to the ESMA Call for Evidence (March 2013) 2. 
50 AIMA (n 28) 6. 
51 ESMA (n 2) 19. 
52 Regulation 236/2012, recital 3.  
53 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Evaluation of the Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit 
Default Swaps’ (n 3) 2-4. 
 9 
well. The lack of harmonization between regulators results in operational difficulties, 
confusion, and creates a risk for data quality.
54
 
5 US Transparency Requirements 
 
Moving across the Atlantic, the main difference with the EU is the absence of an 
individualized reporting obligation in the US. Instead, the US rules include marking 
requirements and a variety of more general reporting obligations. Recently, there has also 
been an increase in publicly available short selling information, and Dodd-Frank has now 
introduced further proposals.   
5.1 Marking and Reporting Requirements 
 
Order Marking  
 
Rule 200 of Regulation SHO sets out reporting requirements for sales of all equity securities.  
Rule 200(g) provides that a broker or dealer must mark all sell orders as ‘long’, ‘short’ or 
‘short exempt’.
55
  Under rule 200(g)(1) an order to sell shall be marked long only if the seller 
is deemed to own the security pursuant to rule 200 and either the security is in the broker-
dealer’s physical possession or control, or it is reasonably expected that the security will be in 
their physical possession or control no later than settlement.  This limits the possibility of 
marking an order long as a person may be deemed to own the security being sold but 
possession, control or the reasonable expectation thereof in time for settlement may not be 
present.
56
  Further, SEC guidance currently also errs on the side of marking orders short.
57
  
 
Audit Trails 
 
In the US, securities exchanges, securities associations (such as FINRA
58
), and clearing 
agencies are all classified as self-regulatory organizations (‘SROs’) and maintain their own 
audit trails for their members. Specifically, FINRA imposes its own order recording and 
reporting requirements under its order audit trail system (‘OATS’).
59
  These rules impose 
obligations on FINRA member firms to report order information to FINRA on a daily basis.
60
 
Initially, the rules only applied to equity securities listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market 
(‘Nasdaq’) and to OTC equity securities, however the rules were expanded to cover all 
national market system (‘NMS’)
61
 stocks during 2011. To avoid duplicate reporting, the New 
York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’) and NYSE Arca replaced their requirements for members 
                                                      
54 ESMA (n 2) 19. 
55 For further details on the ‘short exempt’ marking, see Appendix. 
56 E.g. a person may be deemed to own the securities but there may be transfer restrictions meaning the 
seller cannot meet the possession or control requirements.  
57 SEC, ‘FAQs on Regulation SHO’ (2012) Question 2.5 
<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm (ttp://perma.cc/VFP2-F4MN)> 
accessed 9 June 2014. 
58 FINRA, created in 2007, was designed as a monopoly SRO under the SEC’s oversight.   
59 FINRA rules 7410-7470. 
60 SEC, ‘Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change, Release No. 34-63311’ (12 November 2010). For 
short sale orders, the broker will record the order’s designation as short and report this to FINRA. 
61 A ‘NMS stock’ is defined in rule 600(b)(47) Regulation NMS. For further details, see Appendix.  
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who were members of FINRA or Nasdaq with rules allowing them to satisfy their obligations 
by meeting the OATS requirements.
62
 
 
Trade Reporting 
 
Once an order is executed, a report is submitted to either the exchange or to FINRA if 
executed OTC. This includes identification as to whether the transaction is a short or long 
sale.
63
   Separately, the SEC can also request that a broker-dealer firm submits information 
including whether a transaction was a purchase, sale, or short sale (‘electronic blue sheet’ 
(‘EBS’) submissions). This helps assist the SEC with investigations of federal securities 
violations by identifying buyers and sellers of particular securities.
64
   
 
Large Traders 
 
Separately, ‘large traders’
65
 are now required to register and receive an identification number 
from the SEC.
66
 This number allows large traders’ activities to be aggregated across multiple 
broker-dealers and provides the SEC with a faster way to acquire information, including 
relating to short selling activity.
67
  Upon request the SEC can also require broker-dealers to 
report transaction information including the time of execution for any trade involving a large 
trader.  
 
5.2 Consolidated Audit Trail 
 
All these requirements provide mechanisms for capturing information concerning short sale 
orders and trade reports. Despite this, the rules do not produce a complete audit trail and 
suffer from deficiencies including levels of accuracy, completeness and timeliness.
68
  It has 
already been observed that marking short sale orders can be fairly complex and that there is a 
tendency to err on marking orders short.
69
 Likewise, the OATS information will not include 
activity occurring at exchanges or broker-dealers that are not FINRA or Nasdaq 
members.
70
Further, an investigation involving short sellers could involve a rather 
cumbersome process including gathering data from SROs, information requests via EBS 
reports, plus obtaining large trader information from broker-dealers.
71
   
 
Essentially, the existing regulatory data infrastructure is inadequate and ineffective to oversee 
widely dispersed trading across a variety of market centres.
72
 Indeed, the SEC has stated that 
                                                      
62 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (n 5) 27. 
63 SIFMA, ‘Short Sale Reporting Study’ (23 June 2011) 3.  
64 SEC, ‘Electronic Submission of Securities Transaction Information, Release No. 34-44494’ (29 June 
2001).  
65 ‘Large trader’ is defined in rule 13h-1(a)(1)(i) Exchange Act. For further details, see Appendix.  
66 SEC, ‘Large Trader Reporting, Release 34-64976’ (27 July 2011). 
67 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 25. 
68 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (n 5) 27-28. 
69 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 21-22. 
70 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (n 5) 28. 
71 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 29.  
72 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (n 5) 4. 
 11 
regulators have to ‘cobble together disparate data from a variety of existing information 
systems lacking in completeness, accuracy, accessibility and/or timeliness’.
73
  
 
With this in mind in 2012 the SEC required the SROs to submit a plan governing the creation 
and implementation of the CAT for exchange listed securities and options.
74
 As observed in 
section 1, this will result in a comprehensive data repository for all information concerning 
orders and execution.
75
 The plan was submitted to the SEC in September 2014 and is now 
subject to its review. It is estimated it could take at least three to five years before it is 
implemented.
76
 
 
If the plan is approved, this should considerably improve market oversight, enabling 
regulators to have access to information on all orders to trade NMS securities in a single 
system, including the security type, size, short sale order mark, and customer identity.
77
 With 
the data, the SEC and SROs will be able to run processes to quickly identify the activity of 
large short sellers.
78
  Thus, as will be explored further at section 5.3 below, although it has 
some limitations, the CAT’s implementation should considerably improve regulators’ access 
to useful short selling information.
79
 
5.2.1 Public Disclosure: SROs 
In July 2009, the SEC announced that instead of renewing emergency short selling rules it 
had adopted during the crisis, it was working with the SROs to increase the public availability 
of short selling related information.  First, the SROs would commence daily publication of 
aggregate ‘short sale volume’ information in each equity security for that day.
80
  Further, on a 
one month delayed basis, SROs would also publish information regarding individual short 
sale transactions in all exchange-listed equity securities.
81
  Informal guidance indicated that 
                                                      
73 Ibid 6. 
74 Ibid 1.  
75 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Davis Polk, ‘Current Market Structure 
Issues in the U.S. Equity and Options Markets’ (US Equity Market Structure Conference, 17 October 
2013) 26. 
76 Note that in October 2014, FINRA announced its own initiative to implement a comprehensive 
automated risk data system initiative (‘CARDS’). This would require FINRA members to submit 
extensive data to FINRA on a monthly basis. Concerns are already being raised as to duplication and 
whether this proposal is necessary on top of the CAT initiative, see e.g. Davis Polk, ‘FINRA Proposes 
New “CARDS” Data Collection System’ (30 October 2014). 
77 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 24. The information is also 
required to be reported by 8 am on the trading day following the day on which the information is 
recorded. 
78 See ibid 24. 
79 Indeed, once implemented the CAT will be the world’s largest repository of securities transactions. It 
is estimated that it will receive approximately 58 billion records on a daily basis, see e.g. ‘Summary of 
the Consolidated Audit Trail Initiative’ (2014)  
<http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p571933.pdf> 
accessed 11 November 2014. 
80 SEC, ‘Increasing Transparency around Short Sales’ (2009) 3 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm (http://perma.cc/5TNB-4NDG)> accessed 2 June 
2014. Short selling volume was defined as the volume of executed orders marked short (or short 
exempt following the introduction of the alternative uptick rule). 
81 Ibid 3. The SEC would also publish data twice monthly on fails to deliver for all equity securities 
regardless of the fail levels. 
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individual investor identification was not being contemplated.
82
 Rather the information is 
anonymised and contains data including the transaction date, the symbol, price, and number 
of shares for every transaction.
 83
 
 
Despite the increase in publicly available data, market participants do not appear to widely 
monitor or use the information available.
 84
 This suggests that issuers and investors do not use 
such data to try and detect any abusive shorting activity; rather they rely on the regulators to 
monitor for potentially manipulative behaviour.
 
 
 
5.3 Dodd-Frank 
 
5.3.1 Section 417(a)(2)(A): Real-Time Short Position Reporting 
Turning to the Dodd-Frank proposals, section 417(a)(2) required the SEC to conduct two 
studies in relation to short sale position and transaction reporting.
85
  Examining section 
417(a)(2)(A), this required the SEC to conduct a study of the feasibility, benefits, and costs of 
requiring reporting publicly, in real-time, short sale positions of publicly listed securities, or 
alternatively only reporting these to the SEC and FINRA.  
 
Public Disclosure  
 
First, considering real-time disclosure that would publicly identify short sellers, although this 
would provide market participants with new information that they cannot infer from existing 
information,
86
 the drawbacks observed in relation to the EU’s public disclosure regime remain 
prominent. For instance, due to concerns about revealing their trading strategies, short sellers 
may curtail their activities, which would have a harmful effect on price efficiency.
87
 Equally, 
investors could misunderstand the information: indeed given the volume of information that 
would be released, most market participants would be unable to directly analyze the data.
88
 
Further, real-time reporting would also require an entirely new infrastructure and the on-
going costs of compliance could also be significant.
89
  
 
Reporting to the Regulators 
 
Turning to reporting that would only identify short sellers to the SEC and FINRA, this would 
clearly help in detecting and bringing actions relating to manipulation, particularly if indirect 
positions were also included.
90
  However, this option would entail the same costs of 
                                                      
82 Schulte, Roth and Zabel, ‘SEC to Increase Public Disclosure of Short-Selling’ (29 July 2009). 
83 Separately, FINRA publishes total short interest data of FINRA member firms twice a month. 
84 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 19. 
85 Section 929X(a) of Dodd Frank also provided that short sale disclosure would be required of 
institutional investment managers on at least a monthly basis. The SEC is still to adopt rules in relation 
to this section however the general expectation is that this information will be released publicly on an 
aggregate basis. For a definition of ‘institutional investment manager’, see Appendix. 
86 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 73.  
87 Ibid 80. 
88 The SEC estimated there could be approximately 24 million short position changes per day. 
89
 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 86. 
90 Ibid 111. 
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implementation and compliance as a public regime, and the SEC considered that the benefits 
would only be modest when taking account of the CAT.
91
  
 
Aggregate and Anonymous Disclosure 
 
A further option proposed public reporting of aggregate, non-identified short positions.
92
 
Although this could help investors gauge market sentiment in real-time, it would provide little 
benefit with respect to detecting abuse.
93
  Further, many of the limitations already highlighted 
would also remain: the data would be cumbersome to work with and there would be high 
compliance costs. Indeed, these costs could be higher due to the additional step of having to 
aggregate the data before disclosing it. 
 
Essentially, the SEC concluded that the benefits of real-time reporting were likely to be 
modest, and the costs would likely be significant.
94
 This was especially so when considering 
the data that would be available once the CAT was implemented. However, as already 
observed, although the CAT will undoubtedly bring much needed improvements, its value 
will initially be curtailed by its limited coverage. 
 
5.3.2 Section 417(a)(2)(B): Short Sale Transaction Data 
Section 417(a)(2)(B) also provided that the SEC should conduct a study into the feasibility, 
benefits, and costs of conducting a voluntary pilot in which public companies agreed to have 
trades of their shares marked ‘short’, ‘market maker short’, ‘buy’, ‘buy to cover’ or ‘long’ and 
reported in real-time through the Consolidated Tape (the system that reports transaction 
information for listed securities and ETFs).
95
 The SEC concluded that the most feasible way 
to report transaction marks to the Consolidated Tape would be to populate the marks with 
information from the order marks, reflecting the investor’s position at the time of the order 
entry rather than the point of execution.
 96
 As already observed, this could again lead to over-
estimations as to the number of short trades taking place.
97
 
 
Real-time availability of these transaction marks would increase the comprehensiveness and 
precision of the data market participants would obtain.
98
  It would also provide new 
information on real-time market sentiment and could discourage abusive short selling, 
especially if it enhanced surveillance. However the benefits to regulators would again only be 
modest once the CAT was factored in. Likewise, although non-regulators could use the data 
to monitor for abusive behaviour, it has already been observed that issuers do not use, and in 
some cases are not even aware of, existing public data.
99
 Further, misinterpretation of the 
marks could result in poor trading decisions, and there would be potential for mismarking.
100
  
                                                      
91 Ibid 109. 
92 Ibid 93.  
93 Ibid 95-96. 
94 Ibid 115. 
95 Under current rules, order marks are not reported to the Consolidated Tape but are maintained as part 
of the broker-dealer’s records. For further details on the Consolidated Tape, see Appendix. 
96 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 35. 
97 Ibid 36. 
98 Ibid 38. 
99 Ibid 49-50. 
100 Ibid 44. 
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The sheer volume of the data would also limit its value,
101
 and it would be expensive to add 
the marks with hundreds of market participants having to update their systems.
102
  
 
Ultimately, as this information was already broadly captured under existing requirements, and 
was also available to the regulator, the SEC concluded that adding transaction marks would 
have little additional regulatory benefit particularly once the CAT was in place.
103
  
6 Comments: US Rules 
 
Short sale reporting requirements currently form only a relatively small part of the US’s 
regulatory landscape. Further, the systems that are in place, at least prior to the CAT’s 
implementation, are somewhat fragmented. No data regularly provides the identities of short 
sellers to the regulator, and the available information can over-estimate the number of those 
establishing or increasing a short position. Next, to the extent that public information is 
disclosed, it is under-utilized. It is disappointing that less emphasis is placed on the 
importance of reporting in the US given that one of the SEC’s particular concerns is to 
monitor for abusive behaviour and given that such requirements could provide it with a useful 
tool in this regard.  
 
Despite this, it is also clear that the CAT will result in considerable improvements and its 
development should be welcomed. However, the project is still in its early stages with many 
difficult decisions being delegated to the SROs, so it remains to be seen what will materialize 
going forward. Likewise, it is also clear that the CAT will overlap with some of the existing 
reporting requirements. This is worth bearing in mind: the current regime is already rather 
murky and it would be helpful for duplicative rules to be eliminated for clarity. 
7 Lessons to be learned? 
 
It is important to remember what is valuable about reporting requirements and in this regard a 
number of clear statements can be made. First, the primary objective of a short selling 
reporting regime should be to deter market abuse, and regulatory commitments to fairness and 
transparency do not equate to granting investors and participants a free ride on others’ 
proprietary information or investment strategies.
104
 Next, individual short position 
notifications are helpful to regulators in combating potentially abusive behaviour.  Further, 
encompassing direct and indirect positions is crucial: it demonstrates a level of sophistication 
and prevents easy circumvention of the rules. Despite this, it is also sensible to restrict the 
ambit of notification requirements to situations where there is a high risk of abuse. Next, 
public disclosure obligations are unhelpful and can be detrimental to market efficiency. 
Finally, implementing a centralized set of rules is vital.   
 
The EU’s approach can be welcomed in as far as it supports confidential reporting of direct 
and indirect NSPs to regulators. However the regime fails to strike the correct balance: it 
applies permanently, the thresholds are too low, and there are serious concerns in relation to 
public disclosure. Indeed the evidence from the EU suggests that short sellers are avoiding 
                                                      
101 The SEC estimated there could initially be 23 million transaction reports per day on the 
Consolidated Tape. 
102 SEC, ‘Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting Report’ (n 4) 37. Moreover, pilots are subject 
to various limitations, for instance market participants knowing a pilot is underway may not act as they 
would under a permanent regime. See ibid 64-65. 
103 NYSE Euronext, ‘Testimony of Joseph Mecane’ (Short Sale Roundtable, 30 September 2009) 2. 
104 World Federation of Exchanges, ‘Public Comment on Regulation of Short Selling’ (7 May 2009) 2. 
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crossing the public threshold and are moving capital elsewhere, and this cannot have been the 
regulators’ intention. In this regard the EU should look to the US: for all its other 
complexities, the absence of individual public disclosure requirements in the US is sensible. 
Likewise, the EU reporting systems currently suffer from an ironic lack of harmonization. 
With this in mind it should pay close attention to the CAT’s development: a centralized 
system would be far more in keeping with the vision of harmonized reporting rules.  
 
Turning to the US, a multitude of different rules exist: some imposed by statute, others by 
SROs, some that are general, others that relate specifically to short selling. Likewise, the 
current US framework also makes it challenging for the SEC to effectively investigate cases 
of potential manipulation. Regulators are required to ‘cobble together’ many sources of 
information lacking in timeliness, accuracy and accessibility: a model that does not result in a 
complete and accurate set of data.
105
 Although the CAT should eventually bring 
improvements, the project is still in its infancy. Ultimately, until the US follows the EU’s lead 
in requiring individual NSP reporting to the regulator, any system will be of limited use to it. 
8 Conclusion 
 
There is currently little consistency in the approach taken in the EU and the US to short sale 
reporting obligations, and supranational harmonization remains a distant aspiration. Further, 
at present there is not even consistency between the regulators’ implementation of reporting 
rules within the EU. This is disappointing: harmonization both within and between 
jurisdictions is vital in today’s international markets in order to prevent confusion and to 
avoid additional challenges and costs for market participants.  
 
Looking to the future, both jurisdictions should pay heed to the words of IOSCO that noted 
that short selling reporting was a ‘greenfield’ area and that regulators would have limited 
experience.
106
 With this in mind, the EU and US should acknowledge they have not yet found 
the correct balance with their choice of transparency regimes and contemplate what changes 
may now be required. Lessons should be learned on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that 
short selling reporting obligations can be helpful rather than a hindrance.  
  
                                                      
105 SEC, ‘Consolidated Audit Trail, Release No. 34-67457 (Final Rule)’ (n 5) 6. 
106 IOSCO, ‘Regulation of Short Selling, Final Report’ (June 2009) 14. 
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Appendix  
 
Term 
 
Definition 
Baskets of Securities A group of securities that are treated as a 
single unit and traded together. 
 
Consolidated Tape The Consolidated Tape comprises of Tapes A 
and B of the Consolidated Tape Plan and 
Tape C of the Unlisted Trading Privileges 
(‘UTP’) Plan.  
 
Trades in NYSE-listed securities are reported 
to Tape A; trades in NYSE-Amex, NYSE-
Arca, and regional exchange listed securities 
are reported to Tape B; and trades in Nasdaq 
listed securities are reported to Tape C.   
 
Delta-Adjusted Model ‘Delta’ indicates how much a financial 
instrument’s theoretical value is expected to 
move in case of an underlying instrument’s 
price variation. For example a stock option 
with options delta of 0.8 would be expected 
to rise £0.80 with a £1 rise in the underlying 
stock.  
 
EU Delegated Regulation 918/2012, Annex 
II provides that derivative and cash positions 
(i.e. direct short positions in a stock) shall be 
accounted for on a delta-adjusted basis with 
cash positions having delta 1. 
 
Exchange Traded Fund (‘ETF’) An ETF holds a portfolio of securities or 
derivatives and aims to track and replicate the 
performance of an index, a commodity, or 
basket of assets.  ETFs trade on the stock 
exchange. 
 
Institutional Investment Manager Sections 3(a)(9) and 13(f)(6) Exchange Act 
defines an institutional investment manager 
as a person investing in or buying and selling 
securities for its own account, and any person 
exercising investment discretion with respect 
to the account of any other person. 
 
Large Trader Broadly, this relates to a person whose 
transactions in NMS securities equals or 
exceeds 2 million shares or $20 million 
during any calendar day, or 20 million shares 
of $200 million during any calendar month. 
 
NMS Securities NMS securities broadly refer to exchange 
listed securities and standardized options. 
 
 17 
NMS Stocks NMS stocks broadly refer to exchange listed 
securities other than options. 
 
‘Short Exempt’ Order Marking Marking an order as ‘short exempt’ reflects 
the reintroduction of a type of price test in the 
US in 2010 (i.e. the ‘alternative uptick rule’). 
Rule 200(g)(2) of Regulation SHO provides 
that after the 10 per cent circuit breaker is 
triggered for a security, a sale order is 
permitted to be marked short exempt if the 
broker-dealer identifies the order as being at 
a price above the national best bid at the time 
of submission. 
 
Short Position Direct Short Position: a short position taken 
in the stock itself (also known as a ‘cash 
position’). 
 
Indirect Short Position: Other types of 
economic exposure to the stock e.g. through 
the use of derivatives. 
 
Net Short Position (‘NSP’): The position 
that remains after deducting any long 
position a person holds from any short 
position a person holds in relation to a 
company’s issued share capital. 
 
Short Squeeze If share prices rise quickly and are sustained 
for a period then short sellers can be caught 
in a short squeeze with covering short 
positions driving prices up further.  This can 
result in substantial losses and can lead to 
increased volatility. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
